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1Abstract
On July 21, 2004, the President signed into law the Project BioShield Act of 2004. This legislation
was intended to stimulate research, development, and procurement of countermeasures against bi-
ological, chemical, radiological or nuclear agents that may be used in a terrorist attack against the
United States, given America’s demonstrated and increasing vulnerability to these attacks, as well
as the deﬁcit in countermeasures to prevent and ameliorate the eﬀects of such attacks. Despite the
innovative provisions of the Act, is has been largely a failure and has not properly incentivized the
private pharmaceutical industry to develop these needed products. This paper examines the Act and
the criticism surrounding its implementation. The paper then evaluates alternatives to the Project
BioShield Act, including BioShield II, now pending in the 109th Congress. The paper concludes by
ﬁnding that the Project BioShield Act is a good ﬁrst step in addressing biodefense, but Congress
needs to go farther to order to respond to America’s vulnerabilities to a biological terrorist attack.
I.
2Introduction
September 11th and the subsequent anthrax attacks drew attention to the possibility of a biological attack
against America. These events also highlighted America’s lack of preparation for such an attack. This deﬁcit
was in part the result of an inadequate natural market for the types of medical and scientiﬁc products that
would prevent or ameliorate the eﬀects of such an attack. The President and United States Congress re-
sponded with an initiative called the Project BioShield Act of 2004. Part II of this paper provides background
information, explaining the real threat of a terrorist attack and this country’s speciﬁc vulnerabilities. Part
II also discusses how some of these vulnerabilities are the result of a stymied market for biodefense counter-
measures and how the government is expected to respond to produce such a market. Part III describes the
actual enacted legislation—the Project Bioshield Act of 2004. The Act is comprised of four main sections:
countermeasures research and development authorities, countermeasure procurement authorities, authoriza-
tion for medical products for use in emergencies, and reporting requirements. In addition to summarizing
these sections, Part III provides a brief history and the legislative intent of the Act. Part IV discusses the
actual implementation of the Act and the criticism surrounding that implementation, including a confusing
government bureaucracy; unaccounted for public health priorities; funding gaps; and the absence of any
liability protection for companies researching, developing and manufacturing countermeasures. Alternatives
and improvements upon the Act, including a comprehensive new bill,—BioShield II—are oﬀered at Part V.
I.
Background: The Problem
a.
3Vulnerabilities
The threat of biological agents being used deliberately to harm civilian populations has long been a reality,
but after September 11, 2001 and the subsequent anthrax attacks, Americans began to realize that America is
vulnerable to these threats.1 The potential devastation resulting from such an attack is enormous. President
Bush declared that, “Armed with a single vial of biological agent, small groups of fanatics, or failing states,
could gain the power to threaten great nations, threaten the world peace. America, and the entire civilized
world, will face this threat for decades to come. We must confront the danger with open eyes and unbending
purpose.” In a Homeland Security Presidential Directive, the White House outlined that attacks with
biological weapons could: cause catastrophic numbers of acute casualties, long-term disease and disability,
psychological trauma, and mass panic; disrupt critical sectors of the American economy and the day-to-day
lives of Americans; and create cascading international eﬀects by disrupting and damaging international trade
relationships, potentially globalizing the impacts of an attack on United States soil.2 Senate Majority Leader
Bill Frist, during a session of Congress, asserted, “Agents of bioterror are potentially the most powerful and
devastating weapons of mass destruction that are known to man. Bioterror agents are more powerful than
traditional weapons of mass destruction, are more powerful than chemical weapons, are more powerful than
1Ryan Kemper, Responding to Bioterrorism: An Analysis of Titles I and II of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 83 Wash. U. L. Q. 385, 386 (2005) (noting that the use of biological agents as a
means to invoke fear and inﬂict destruction dates back to at least 1346 when soldiers loaded victims of bubonic plague into
catapults to launch over city walls).
2Biodefense for the 21st Century, Homeland Security Presidential Directive – 10, April 28, 2004,
http://www.fas.org/irp/oﬀdocs/nspd/hspd-10.html, last accessed April 10, 2006. The President has also often pointed
to biological threats emanating from Saddam Hussein, although these threats have failed to materialize. In his State of the
Union Address to Congress in 2003, the President explained, “The United Nations concluded in 1999 that Saddam Hussein had
biological weapons suﬃcient to produce over 25,000 liters of anthrax –enough doses to kill several million people. He hasn’t
accounted for that material. He’s given no evidence that he has destroyed it. The United Nations concluded that Saddam
Hussein had materials suﬃcient to produce more than 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin—enough to subject millions of people
to death by respiratory failure. He hadn’t accounted for that material. He’s given no evidence that he has destroyed it. Our
intelligence oﬃcials estimate that Saddam Hussein had the materials to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX
nerve agent. In such quantities, these chemical agents could also kill untold thousands. He’s not accounted for these materials.
He has given no evidence that he has destroyed them. U.S. intelligence indicates that Saddam Hussein had upwards of 30,000
munitions capable of delivering chemical agents. Inspectors recently turned up 16 of them—despite Iraq’s recent declaration
denying their existence. Saddam Hussein has not accounted for the remaining 29,984 of these prohibited munitions. He’s given
no evidence that he has destroyed them.” Address Before a J. Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 107 Weekly
Comp. Pres. Doc. 114 (Jan. 28, 2003).
4nuclear weapons.”3 His rationale was that bioterror agents can be infectious: “they are agents of virus, of
bacteria, of another living organism that cannot be seen, that cannot be touched, that cannot be smelled
or heard.” Further, he reasoned, “They know no borders. There are no geographic borders. They attack
indiscriminately, and they can travel through a school, they can travel through a community, they can travel
through a State, they can travel through a country, and they can travel, indeed, through a continent. They
are powerful, powerful agents.”4 There is no dispute with the President or the Senator’s contentions that
the consequences of a biological attack on American soil would be devastating, yet America has shown it is
wholly unprepared to deal with these kinds of biological threats.5
In the fall of 2001, letters containing anthrax spores were mailed to news media personnel and congressional
oﬃces.6 Outbreaks of the disease were concentrated in six locations: Florida; New York; New Jersey;
Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C.; the Washington, D.C. regional area, including Maryland and Virginia;
and Connecticut.7 The anthrax incidents cased illness in 22 people: 11 with cutaneous (skin) form of the
disease and 11 with inhalational (respiratory) form.8 Five people died.9 Demands on public health resources
reached far beyond even the six epicenters of the outbreak.10 Once oﬃcials realized that mail processed at
contaminated postal facilities could be cross-contaminated and end up anywhere in the country, residents
brought samples of suspicious powders to oﬃcials for testing and worried about the safety of their daily
3150 Cong. Rec. S5744, 5760 (2004).
4Id.
5See 150 Cong. Rec. H5721, 5729 (2004) (statement of Rep. Turner) (“[I]n spite of this dire and clear warning, our
biodefenses are no better than they were in September of 2001. No new medical treatments, vaccines, or lifesaving drugs have
been approved for use. There is no antitoxin for ricin poisoning, no vaccine to protect against the plague, and no treatments of
any kind against the deadly ebola virus.”).
6U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Bioterroism: Public Health Response to Anthrax Incidents of 2001 1 (2003).
7Id.
8Id.
9Id.
10Id. at 9.
5mail.11
In dealing with this crisis, there were deﬁciencies in both the local public health response and the federal
government’s ability to manage it. Local and state public health oﬃcials explained that problems arose
because they had not fully anticipated the extent of coordination needed among responders and they did
not have the necessary agreements in place to put the plans into operation rapidly.12 They reported that
communication among response agencies was generally eﬀective, but they ran into trouble reaching clinicians
to provide them with guidance, and that they had not anticipated the number of entities with which they
would have to communicate.13 The state and local oﬃcials in the epicenters also reported that the capacity
of the public health workforce and clinical workforce was strained and they would have been unable respond
to a more extensive outbreak.14
The federal government was similarly challenged as the Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention (CDC)
had to meet demands from local and state oﬃcials as well as coordinate the federal response. The CDC
reported that it was not fully prepared to manage the federal public health response and had diﬃculty in
handling the voluminous amount of information coming into the agency, and in communicating with public
health oﬃcials, the media and the public.15 The anthrax incidents also revealed the shortcomings in clinical
tools available to respond to anthrax—such as vaccines and drugs—and the lack training for clinicians in
how to recognize and respond to an outbreak of anthrax.16
11Id. at 1.
12Id.
13Public health departments had to coordinate their responses with those of local and federal enforcement, emergency re-
sponders, the postal community, environmental agencies, and clinicians. Id. at 11.
14Id. at 1.
15Id. CDC Employees slept in their laboratories around the clock to perform tests on tens of thousands of specimens. David
Johnston, Report Calls U.S. Agencies Understaﬀed for Bioterror, N.Y. Times, July 6, 2003, §1 at 1.
16U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 6, at 1. One article detailed the tragic death of a postal worker in the
D.C. metro area who had gone to the hospital with “ﬂulike symptoms,” but the hospital did not know initially that he was a
postal worker and sent him home with medications for nausea and dehydration. Elizabeth Becker and Robin Toner, A Nation
Challenged: The Victims; Postal Workers’ Illness Set Oﬀ No Alarms, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 2001, at B1.
6Another biological attack occurred two years later when the toxin ricin was discovered in Senator Frist’s
oﬃce in the Dirksen Oﬃce Building, in February 2004, and in a postal facility in Greenville, South Carolina,
in October 2003.17 Ricin is a potent plant toxin found in the seeds of the castor plants.18 It works by
blocking cell protein synthesis and can lead to organ failure and death of the victim.19 After the toxin was
discovered in a letter-opening machine in the Senator’s oﬃce, federal investigators examined some 20,000
pieces of mail hoping to ﬁnd the source of the ricin, but turned up nothing to lead them to a suspect.20
They were unable to determine whether the ricin had been there for hours, weeks, or even months before
it was discovered by an intern in the oﬃce.21 Many experts believe that it would be diﬃcult to use ricin
as a weapon of mass destruction because ricin needs to be injected, ingested, or inhaled by the victim to
injure.22 Thus, deploying ricin to cause mass casualties is logistically impractical even for a well-funded
terrorist organization.23 However, most experts agree that ricin is a formidable weapon if used in small-scale
attacks.24 There is currently no vaccine available for use by the general public, nor any speciﬁc medicine
available to treat ricin exposure.25 However, there are currently several methods available to detect the
release of ricin, but these detectors are not widely implemented in civilian settings.26
Despite the ineﬀectiveness demonstrated by public health oﬃcials in the anthrax and ricin attacks, vulnera-
bilities to bioterrorism remain.27 In discussing the likelihood of a bioterrorist attack, industry leaders see the
17Allan Lengel, Probe of Ricin on Hill Still Wide Open, FBI says; Toxin found in February Provides Few Clues, Wash.
Post, April 6, 2004, at B04.
18Dana A. Shea and Frank Gottron, Cong. Research Serv, RS21383, Ricin: Technical Background and Potential
Role in Terrorism 2 (2004).
19Id.
20Lengel, supra note 17.
21Id.
22Shea and Gottron, supra note 18, at 6.
23Id.
24Id.
25Id.at 2-3.
26Id. at 3.
27Sari Horwitz and Christian Davenport, Terrorism Could Hurl D.C. Area Into Turmoil; Despite Eﬀorts Since 9/11, Response
Plans Incomplete, Wash. Post, September 11, 2005, at A01.
7question not as whether America will be attacked with an organism for which we have no countermeasure,
but when.28 One noted, “Any high school student can create genetically engineered organism.”29 While
many technological hurdles exist for anyone attempting to use biological weapons against a civilian popula-
tion, some say that it is all but inevitable that al Qaeda or another terrorist group will be able to gain the
expertise necessary to inﬂict mass casualties in this manner.30 Advances in bioscience and the rapid dissem-
ination of this knowledge worldwide—especially through the internet—make it easier to create dangerous
pathogens.31 Richard Danzig, a former Navy secretary and current biowarfare consultant to the Pentagon
conjectures that, “it seems like that, over a period of between a few months and a few years, broadly skilled
individuals equipped with modest laboratory equipment can develop biological weapons. Only a thin veil of
terrorist ignorance and inexperience now protects us.”32
Threats of biological attacks also derive from more concrete sources. During the 1970s and 80s, the Soviet
Union was developing biological weapons using specially engineered strains of dangerous pathogens, including
anthrax, plague and smallpox.33 A Government Accountability Oﬃce (GAO) report from April 2000 found
that biological weapons institutes in the former Soviet Union “continue to maintain vast collections of
dangerous pathogens that could be used for...an oﬀensive biological weapons program.” For instance,
Vector, one of the institutes, is one of the world’s two authorized smallpox repositories and also contains a
culture collection that includes the highly lethal Marburg and Ebola viruses.34 The GAO report found that
28Is BioShield Doing the Job?, 24 Biotechnology L. Rep. 56, 56 (2005).
29Id.; Speciﬁcally, some scientists believe that a sophisticated terrorist would not even need to obtain the natural smallpox
virus, but could make it from scratch. Andrew Pollack, With Biotechnology, A Potential to Harm, N.Y. Times, November
27, 2001, at F6. Robert L. Erwin, Chief executive of Large Scale Biology Corporation, a biotech company that does research
involving plant viruses, claims that the complete genome sequence of the virus is freely available on the Internet and, in theory,
could be used to transform a related virus into smallpox itself. Id.
30John Mintz, Technological Hurdles Separate Terrorists from Biowarfare, Wash. Post, Dec. 20, 2004, at A01.
31Id.
32Id.
33Philip Taubman, An Arsenal of Germs, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1999, §7 (Book Review Desk) at 15. The program was one of
the best-kept secrets of the cold war, consuming close to $1 billion per year and employing more than 60,000 people at dozens
of sites while Mikhail Gorbachev was the Soviet leader. Id.
34U.S. Gov’t. Accountability Office, Biological Weapons: Effort to Reduce Soviet Threat Offers Benefits,
8these institutes—consisting of as many as 15,000 underpaid scientists and researchers, specialized facilities
and equipment and large collections of dangerous pathogens—continue to threaten U.S. national security.35
They could pose a potential danger if hostile countries or groups were to hire them or the biological weapons
scientists to conduct research, or were to obtain dangerous pathogens originating from the institutes.36 GAO
noted that deteriorated physical safety and security conditions could leave dangerous pathogens vulnerable
to theft or distribution into the local environment.37 Finally, given the existing infrastructure, there is
potential for renewed production of biological agents in the institutes.38
b.
Deﬁciencies in the Market for Countermeasures
i.
Vaccines not proﬁtable
Despite massive potential threats posed by deleterious biological agents, the harm from such agents can be
alleviated by eﬀective countermeasures. The anthrax attacks were mitigated by the fact that there were
prophylactic antibiotics available for that strain of anthrax.39 Had the government not had accessible large
quantities of Cipro, a known countermeasure, the casualties would have been much greater.40 However, the
Poses New Risks 13 (2000).
35Id. at 5.
36Id.
37Id.
38Id. at 9.
39Frank Gottron and Eric Fischer, Cong. Research Serv., RL32549, Project BioShield: Legislative History and
Side-by-Side Comparison of H.R. 2122, S.15, and S. 1504 1 (2005).
40H.R. Rep. No.108-147, pt. 2, at 15-16.
9government’s response to make this product available highlights some of them trepidations that pharma-
ceutical companies have about entering into the biodefense vaccine market. At the time that Cipro was
desperately needed by the government, Bayer, a large pharmaceutical company held the patent. Bayer was
making the drug available to the government at below wholesale cost.41 But in a panic that not enough of
the product would be available, members of Congress and Secretary of Health and Human Services, Tommy
Thompson, threatened to force compulsory licensing of the patent on Cipro in order to enable generic com-
panies to enter the market, thereby forcing Bayer to lower its already discounted price for the drug.42 While
Cipro’s patent has since ended, this incident draws attention to a fear of the drug industry: the government
will eviscerate its proﬁts in a time of crisis.43 Pharmaceutical companies need clear assurance that their
patent and intellectual property rights will not be compromised in similar circumstances.44
The vaccine industry has been going through a slump in the last few decades because most private sector
research and development dollars go to drugs or devices that will have continuous commercial applica-
tion.45 For instance, last year, sales of Liptor were more proﬁtable than sales for the entire vaccine industry
41Cynthia M. Ho, Inoculation Inventions: The Interplay of Infringement and Immunity in the Development of Biodefense
Vaccines, 8 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 111, 113 (2005).
42Id.
43See Gregory M. Lamb, New Buﬀer for Bioterror’s Tempest, Christian Science Monitor, July 1, 2004, at 14 (“After the
anthrax letters scare, Tommy Thompson, the HHS secretary, demanded that Bayer lower its prices on Cipro, an anthrax drug,
or risk losing its patent –sending a chilling signal to drugmakers.”); Roundtable Discussion: When Terror Strikes—Preparing
an Eﬀective and Immediate Public Health Response: Hearing of the Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 109th
Cong. 45-46 (2005) (response to questions of the committee by Chuck Ludlam, Esq., former legal counsel to Senator Joseph
Lieberman) (“They say, ‘Look what happened to Bayer,’ which was subject to virtual expropriation of its antibiotic, Cipro, by
HHS following the 2001 anthrax attack. In fact, the outrageous actions of HHS in that case have plagued our ability to engage
this industry in this research. We must have credible Administration oﬃcials state categorically that these Maﬁoso tactics will
never ever be seen again against a company that develops countermeasures for infectious pathogens. The companies must be
rewarded, not viliﬁed.”).
44See Project BioShield: Contracting for the Health and Security of the American Public: Hearings Before the Comm. on
Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong. 16 (2003) (statement of Dr. Anthony Fauci, Director, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases) (“However, when you’re dealing with a product for which there is no guarantee of a return, or for which the market
is tenuous, these companies clearly need some assurances that there will ultimately be a return for their investment. Without
such assurances, they will simply pursue the development of other products.”) [hereinafter Project BioShield: Contracting for
the Health and Security of the American Public Hearing].
45Scott Hensley and Bernard Wysocki Jr., Missing Medicine—Shots in the Dark: As Industry Proﬁts Elsewhere, U.S. Lacks
Vaccines, Antibiotics; Incentives are Low to Develop Some Public-Health Drugs; New Moves in Washington; A $200 Million
Legal Fight, Wall St. J., November 8, 2005, at A.1.
10combined.46 There is little incentive for publicly-traded drug companies to make products with low proﬁt
margins, infrequent use and a high likelihood of liability lawsuits, such as vaccines.47 Moreover, drugs that
treat a disease are more lucrative than vaccines to prevent it partly because people are more inclined to pay
for a medicine that treats a condition they already have.48 For example, in one economic model, an expert
determined that revenue from drugs to treat AIDS would be twice as high as from a vaccine to prevent it.49
A successful vaccine may also devour its own market by eradicating the disease it protects against.50 And,
even though some current generation drugs or devices may have special uses as countermeasures to biological
agents like Ebola, there is little motivation to perform the research, development or production activities
that might tailor the drug or drug approvals for such a purpose.51 It is not enough that there may be a
possible one-time purchase by the federal government.52
ii.
Liability
Pharmaceutical companies are reluctant to enter the vaccine industry because they are subject to potentially
huge liability. One industry tale is enough to make anyone uneasy about the future market for vaccine. Wyeth
started making smallpox vaccine in 1885 and was a principle supplier of childhood vaccines in the United
States for most of the 20th Century.53 But beginning in the 1980s, it became the target of lawsuits linking
vaccines to a wide range of illnesses without obvious causes, such as epilepsy and attention deﬁcit disorder.54
Wyeth estimates the industry has spent more than $200 million defending itself against hundreds of lawsuits
46Id.
47Id.
48Id.
49Id.
50Id.
51H.R. Rep. No.108-147, pt. 3 at 17.
52Id.
53Hensley and Wysocki, supra note 45.
54Id.
11alleging that a preservative in some vaccines called thimerosal causes autism and other diseases.55 Yet, since
the lawsuits against thimerosal were ﬁled, four large studies performed in Denmark, the United States, and
the United Kingdom showed that children who received vaccines containing thimerosal were not more likely
to have neurological problems such as speech and language delays, tics, learning disabilities, or autism than
those who did not receive these vaccines.56 In 2004, a group of scientists from the Institute of Medicine, an
independent research organization within the National Academy of Sciences, reviewed studies that examined
the relationship between thimerosal and neurological damage; all studies found the same thing: Thimerosal,
at the level contained in vaccines, did not cause harm.57 The lawsuits have not gone to trial.58
Product liability is an especially risky prospect in the biodefense industry where products cannot be ethically
tested on humans. Drugs to treat diseases like anthrax and smallpox cannot be fully tested in humans
because it would be unethical to poison someone to test the drug’s eﬃcacy.59 Researchers must use relevant
animal models to determine the appropriate human dose of new drugs and gather eﬃcacy data.60 The
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) acknowledged the inherent limitations of testing by waiving human
clinical trials, instead allowing appropriate studies in animals, “to provide substantial evidence of new drug
and biological products used to reduce or prevent the toxicity of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear
substances.”61 Another risk-producing fact is that biodefense-related vaccines and drugs may also be quickly
55Id. Autism has no known cause and no cure. Sandy Kleﬀman, Is There a Link Between Vaccines; Is There a Link Between
Vaccines, Autism?; Some Experts Say Hearing Should Hearing Should Wait for More Evidence, Milwaukee J. Sentinel, Feb.
9, 2004, at 01G.
56Paul A. Oﬃt, Saving Vaccines, 24 Prod. Liability L. & Strat., 3, 3 March 2006
57Id.
58Hensley and Wysocki, supra note 45.
59James T. O’Reilly, Bombing Bureaucratic Complacency: Eﬀects of Counter-Terrorism Pressure Upon Medical Product
Approvals, 60 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 329, 336, n.33 (2004) (“This uncertainty is inherent in the antidote research eﬀort,
but it makes the investor less willing to support the development costs and it expands the company’s liability concerns.”).
60Biodefense: Next Steps: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Bioterrorism and Public Health Preparedness of the Comm.
on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 108th Cong. 47 (Statement of George Painter, CEO, Chimerex).
61New Drug and Biological Drug Products; Evidence Needed to Demonstrate Eﬀectiveness of New Drugs When Human
Eﬃcacy Studies Are Not Ethical or Feasible, 68 Fed. Reg. 37988, 37988-37989 (May 31, 2002).
12distributed in an emergency situation and given to millions of people.62 Given the ﬁnancial consequences
stemming from even potential liability lawsuits, coupled with the increased risks intrinsic to the biodefense
industry, companies have shied away from the manufacture of these products.
iii.
Lengthy FDA Approval Process
Even if a product has been developed to treat diseases or conditions, if the product has not yet been approved
by the FDA, access to the therapy is greatly limited. The FDA approval process is lengthy and complicated.
The conservative and cautious approval process reﬂects the accepted role of the FDA as a gatekeeper.63
Drug approval by the FDA is intentionally arduous and meticulously detailed in its evidentiary requirements
in order to screen out products that may pose health risks.64 One estimate is that the investigational new
drug (IND) process takes seven to thirteen years and costs between $30 million and $50 million.65 Another
more recent article ﬁnds that “costs of new drug developments range from $400 million to over $800 million”
and the costs accumulate over an estimated ten to ﬁfteen years required to gain FDA approval.66
Nothing in the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act allows for the suspension of approval requirements to ensure
62Bernard Wysocki Jr., Missing Medicine—Emergency Response: Fearing Avian Flu, Bioterror, U.S. Scrambles to Fill Drug
Gap; Congress Debates Incentives and Liability Protection for Vaccines, Antibiotics; Trial Lawyers: ‘That’s Unfair,’ Wall
St. J., November 9, 2005, at A.1.
63O’Reilly, supra note 59, at 333.
64Id. at 334.
65Peter Barton Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law, Cases and Materials 514 (2nd Ed. 1991).
66Janene Boyce, Disclosure of Clinical Trial Data: Why Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act Should be Restored,
2005 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 3, 8 (2005); see also, James Thuo Gathii, Rights, Patents, Markets and the Global AIDS
Pandemic, 14 Fla. J. Int’l L. 261, 340 (2002) (“The forgoing process of drug approval takes at least seven years.”); Crossing
the Valley of Death: Bringing Promising Medical Countermeasures to BioShield: Hearing before the Comm. on Health,
Education, Labor and Pensions, Bioterrorism and Public Health Preparedness Subcomm., 109th Cong. 17 (2005) (Statement
of Joe Palma, Medical Director, Chemical/Biological Defense Programs, Oﬃce of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary, U.S.
Department of Defense) (“Fewer than 100 candidates will receive approval by the FDA, and once a product receives FDA
approval it can take, in our estimation, between eight and 10 years and $500 million to $800 million to bring it to market.’)
[hereinafter Hearing on Crossing the Valley of Death].
13access to unapproved drugs and devices on a large-scale basis in times of emergency.67 Under present law, if
a product is not approved by the FDA, then it is unlawful to provide that product to an individual, unless
the product has been authorized for distribution under an IND application (for a drug or biologic) or an
investigational device exemption (IDE). When a drug or device is available under such procedures, a number
of conditions apply that make the use of an IND or IDE infeasible in times of national emergency, where drugs
and devices may need to be deployed at rapid rates. Even if a drug, biologic, or device is highly promising in
treating a disease or condition associated with biological, chemical, radiological or nuclear agents, and even
if it is the only therapy available, current FDA law does not allow for rapid deployment of the product.68
c.
Government Intervention
Given these failings in the market for available countermeasures, members of Congress have accepted that it
is their job to do something to aﬀect the stymied market for biodefense countermeasures in order to provide
for the possible occurrence of a biological attack against Americans. The new cognizance of America’s
vulnerability to potentially devastating bioterrorist attacks has produced sea change in the way that the
federal government approaches biodefense. As one expert testiﬁed after the attacks, “We must understand
that public health is now an essential aspect of national security.”69 Members of Congress from both
sides of the aisle support this premise. One representative discussed how the sheer fact that the American
government is doing anything to deal with the potential of a terrorist attack deters the very possibility of
67H.R. Rep. No.108-147, pt. 3 at 17.
68Id.
69Frank Rapoport, Christopher C. Bouquet, and Scott Flukinger, Project BioShield Act of 2004: Dawn of a New Industry?,
40 SPG Procurement Law 3, 3 (2005)., quoting Terrorism Through the Mail: Protecting Postal Workers and the Public, J.
Hearing Before the Comm. on Governmental Aﬀairs and the Subcomm. on Int’l Security, Proliferation & Fed. Servs., 107th
Cong. (2001) (testimony of Tara O’Toole, M.D.).
14such an attack: “The reality is if al Qaeda knows that we are unprepared for a chemical, a biological or a
radiological attack, then they are incentivized to make that kind of attack. On the other hand if they know
that we have invested the money and done the research and we have developed countermeasures so that a
biological attack or an anthrax attack, an attack of ebola or of the plague is something we are prepared for,
then they are discouraged to even make that kind of attack.”70 He also made the case that this is a job for
the government given that “The American people expect us to do everything humanly possible to prepare
for the event of an attack; but even more importantly they want us to deter any attacks. They want us
to protect the American people from an attack.”71 Representative Waxman made a claim against adopting
a laissez faire attitude toward the market, stating, “I also agree with [the] premise that when the market
cannot foster the development of critical products by itself, the government must rise to the challenge.”72
In his Senate conﬁrmation hearing, Mike Leavitt—now Secretary of Health and Human Services—when
questioned about BioShield and how to revitalize the vaccine industry, similarly voiced a role for the federal
government: “One, we can’t expect that we will have people stepping up to manufacture unless there’s a
market. And there needs to be a market. Sometimes it may need to be the federal government to make
certain that there’s a market.”73 The Legislative and the Executive Branches have both evinced a strong
desire to confront the problem of lack of countermeasures, but it was unclear how that would be done.
II.
The Enacted Legislation: The Project BioShield Act of 2004
In his State of the Union Address in early 2003, President Bush called upon Congress “to add to our future
70150 Cong. Rec. H5721, 5733 (2004) (Statement of Rep. Shadegg).
71Id.
72149 Cong. Rec. H6908, 6930 (2003).
73Nomination of Michael O. Leavitt, Hearing of the Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 109th Cong. 49
(2005).
15security with a major research and production eﬀort to guard our people against bioterrorism, called Project
BioShield.”74 He explained that the budget he planned to send to Congress would propose almost $6 billion
“to quickly make available eﬀective vaccines and treatments against agents like anthrax, botulinum toxin,
Ebola, and plague.”75 In this same speech, the President emphasized the potential threat of bioterrorism,
explaining that the “gravest danger in the war on terror, the gravest danger facing American and the world”
arises from what he called, “outlaw regimes,” that come to possess nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
that they will use for “blackmail, terror, and mass murder.”76 These regimes could, in turn, sell those
weapons to “terrorist allies, who would use them without the least hesitation.”77
Congress complied by passing the Project BioShield Act of 2004. The Act does much to accomplish the
goals the President outlined. It provides needed incentives to the private pharmaceutical industry to produce
the very vaccines for diseases the President mentioned, such as anthrax. However, the Act does not go far
enough to make comprehensive biodefense a reality. This section will summarize the Project BioShield Act,
explaining the key provisions. Then it will turn to a discussion of the rationales and legislative intent behind
the Act. The following section will discuss the implementation of this Act—both the successes and obvious
deﬁcits.
a.
Overview of the Project BioShield Act of 2004
The Project BioShield Act of 2004 was designed to address the Nation’s inadequate means to deal with the
threat from bioterrorism by creating a market for countermeasures. The Act’s stated purpose is “to provide
74Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 107, 109 (Jan. 28,
2003).
75Id.
76Id. at 113.
77Id.
16protections and countermeasures against chemical, radiological or nuclear agents that may be used in a
terrorist attack against the United States by giving the National Institutes of Health contracting ﬂexibility,
infrastructure improvements, and expediting the scientiﬁc peer review process and streamlining the Food and
Drug Administration approval process of countermeasures.”78 The Project BioShield Act does not actually
appropriate any money, but instead authorizes the appropriation of up to a total of $5.593 billion for ﬁscal
year 2004 to ﬁscal year 2013, for the procurement of security countermeasures.79 During ﬁscal year 2004,
$890 million is authorized to be obligated and for ﬁscal years 2004 through 2008, up to $3.418 million may
be obligated.80
Section 2: Countermeasures Research and Development Authorities
The Act gives the Secretary of HHS authority to use expedited procedures related to the research and
development of “qualiﬁed countermeasures,” which are deﬁned as a drug, biological product or device that
used to “(A) treat, identify, or prevent harm from any biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear agent that
may cause a public health emergency aﬀecting national security or (B) treat, identify, or prevent harm from
a condition that may result in adverse health consequences or death and may be caused by administering
a drug, biological product, or device that is used as described in subparagraph (A).”81 The Act relaxes
acquisition procedures under the Federal Acquisition Regulation for the Secretary’s procurement of property
or services for use in qualiﬁed countermeasure research or development activities.82 It does this ﬁrst by
increasing the maximum to $25 million for contracts awarded under simpliﬁed acquisition procedures.83
78Project BioShield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (2004).
79§319-F(2)(b)(1)(a). The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act appropriated this amount. P.L. No. 108-90,
117 Stat. 1137 (2004).
80Project BioShield Act of 2004, §319-F(2)(b)(1)(a).
81Id. §§319F-1(a)(2)(A) – (B).
82Id. §319F-1(b)(1)(A); Frank Gottron, Cong. Research Serv., RS21507, Project BioShield 3 (2005).
83Project BioShield Act of 2004 §319F-1(b)(1)(A).
17Without this authority, the simpliﬁed acquisition threshold would be limited to a range of $100,000 to
$1,000,000, depending on the classiﬁcation of the procurement under Federal Acquisition Regulation.84 The
Act allows these purchases to be made on a basis “other than full and open competition.”85 Otherwise
known as “sole-sourcing,” the Secretary may operate pursuant to this provision even if there is more than
one responsible company that can perform the contract—a departure from the standard under the Federal
Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949,86 which only allows for sole-source procurements where
there is a ﬁnding that the needed item is available from only one responsible source and no other type of
product meets the agency’s needs.87 Other provisions decrease the amount of paperwork required and the
potential for oversight.88 Further, a procurement-related decision may only be subject to review by ﬁling a
protest with either the contracting agency or the Comptroller General; not the Court of Federal Claims or
U.S. District Court.89 Moreover, the act speciﬁcally commits to agency discretion authorizations to award
and perform procurement contracts despite bid protests lodged pursuant to the traditional procurement
protest system.90
The Project BioShield Act allows the Secretary of HHS to use an expedited award process, rather than
the normal peer review process, for grants, contracts, and cooperative agreements related to biomedical
countermeasure research and development activity, if the Secretary deems there is a pressing need for an
expedited award.91 The frequency with which the secretary will subvert the traditional peer review process
will depend on the interpretation the Secretary accords “pressing need.”92
84Rapoport, et al., supra note 69, at 4.
85Project BioShield Act of 2004 §319F-1(b)(1)(D).
8641 U.S.C. §253(c)(1).
87Rapoport, et al., supra note 69, 4.
88Gottron, supra note 82, at 3.
89Project BioShield Act of 2004 §319F-1(b)(4)(A).
90Id. §§319F-1(b)(4)(B)(i)-(ii); 31 U.S.C. §§3553(c)(2), (d)(3)(C).
91Project BioShield Act of 2004 §319F-1(c)(1). The Secretary may not use expedited peer review for qualiﬁed countermeasure
research and development activities that are greater than $1,500,000. Id.§(c)(1)(B).
92Congressional Research Service reports that some scientists have expressed concerns that an expedited peer review process
18Section 3: Countermeasure Procurement Authorities
The Project BioShield Act provides for a Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), to be maintained by the Sec-
retary of HHS, in coordination with the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).93 The
SNS is a stockpile of “drugs, vaccines and other biological products, medical devices, and other supplies...to
provide for the security of the United States, including the emergency health security of children and other
vulnerable populations, in the event of a bioterrorist attack or other public health emergency.”94 One pro-
vision speciﬁcally calls for smallpox vaccines to be added to the stockpile, “suﬃcient to meet the health
security needs of the United States.”95 The animating principle behind this section of the Act is for the
Secretary to create a market for countermeasures by contracting to buy new and successfully developed
countermeasures for the Strategic National Stockpile, ﬁnanced from a newly-created special reserve fund.96
This authority to purchase countermeasures includes products that the Secretary deems will qualify for FDA
approval and licensing in up to eight years.97
To initiate a process for the procurement of products for the National Strategic Stockpile, the Secretary for
DHS ﬁrst completes a material threat assessment.98 These assessments are made on a continuous basis to
evaluate current and ongoing threats of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents and to “deter-
mine which of such agents present a material threat against the U.S. suﬃcient to aﬀect national security.”99
will reduce the quality of the research as that process is designed to maximize the chances that only proposals with the greatest
scientiﬁc merit will get funding. Gottron, supra note 82, at 3.
93Project BioShield Act of 2004 §319F-2(a)(1). Several provisions of new section 319F-2 simply transfer provisions of law from
the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, as amended by the Homeland Security
Act of 2002, including language establishing the Strategic National Stockpile. H.R. Rep. No. 108-147, pt. 1, at 15 (2003).
94Project BioShield Act of 2004 §319F-2(a)(1).
95Id. §319F-2(b)(1).
96Id. §319F-2 (c)(4)(ii); Gottron, supra note 82, at 3.
97Project BioShield Act of 2004 §319F-2(c)(1)(B)(III)(aa).
98Id. §319F-2(c)(2).
99Id. §§319F-2(c)(2)(A)(i) – (ii).
19The Secretary of HHS will then evaluate the potential health consequences stemming from exposure to agents
DHS identiﬁes as material threats, and the necessary countermeasures to combat those consequences.100 The
Secretaries of HHS and DHS are obligated to notify designated congressional committees of material threat
assessments.101
Once the Secretaries for HHS and DHS establish a material threat, they will then make a determination as to
the availability and appropriateness of speciﬁc countermeasures to address that identiﬁed threat.102 If they
identify an appropriate countermeasure that is either currently unavailable for procurement, or is approved,
licensed, or cleared only for alternative uses, they will then submit a proposal to the President to issue a call
for the development of such countermeasure.103 This call will include, at a minimum, a commitment that,
if the development of the countermeasure meets the conditions, the Secretaries will make a recommendation
that the special reserve fund be made available for the procurement that countermeasure.104 The procure-
ment proposal will include 1) the estimated quantity of purchase; 2) the necessary measures of minimum
safety and eﬀectiveness; 3) the estimated price for each dose or eﬀective course of treatment regardless of
dosage forms; and 4) other information necessary to facilitate research, development and manufacture of
the countermeasure or its speciﬁcations.105 In other words, the federal government will issue a request to
the industry that includes a commitment to create the market for that countermeasure, if the appropriate
speciﬁcations are achieved.
100Id. §§319F-2(c)(2)(B)(i) – (ii).
101Id. §319F-2(c)(2)
102Id. §319F-2(c)(3).
103Id.
104Id. §319F-2(c)(4), see Rapoport, et al., supra note 69, at 5.
105Id. §319F-2(c)(4)(B).
20The Secretary of HHS then has the responsibility for determining which countermeasures are appropriate
for inclusion in the stockpile and as a result, funding from the special reserve fund.106 In making this
judgment, the Secretary must consider 1) the quantities of the product that will be needed; 2) the feasibility
of production and delivery of suﬃcient quantities of the product within eight years; and 3) whether there
is a lack of an alternative commercial market for the product at the time of procurement, other than
as countermeasure qualifying for special reserve fund monies.107 The Secretary of HHS, jointly with the
Secretary for DHS, must submit to the President a recommendation that the special reserve fund be made
available for the procurement of such countermeasure.108 The special reserve fund is only available only
if the President approves the Secretaries’ recommendation.109 Once the President issues an approval, the
Secretaries have the added responsibility of notifying designated congressional committees of that decision.110
The actual procurement contracting is left to the Secretary of HHS.111 The Secretary is responsible for
negotiating terms—including quantity, production schedule, and price—and entering into contracts and
cooperative agreements.112 The Secretary is further authorized to issue regulations necessary to implement
this procurement authority.113
Money from the Project BioShield reserve fund is not available to companies until delivery of the total
number of units, unless the Secretary provides that an advance payment is necessary to ensure success of
the project.114 The advance payment may not exceed ten percent of the contract amount and must be
106Id. §319F-2(c)(5)(A).
107Id.
108Id. §319F-2(c)(6)(A).
109Id. §319F-2(c)(6)(B).
110Id. §319F-2(c)(6)(C).
111Id. §319F-2(c)(7)(C)(i)
112Id. §319F-2(c)(7)(C)(i)(I).
113Id. §319F-2(c)(7)(C)(i)(II).
114Id. §319F-2(c)(7)(C)(ii)(I).
21repaid if the vendor does not ultimately deliver the product.115 Thus, the government guarantee reduces
the market risk for the company, but does not aﬀect its exposure to development risk—in other words that
the countermeasure will fail during testing and be thus undeliverable.116
The Secretary also has the authority to avoid many of the complexities of government contracts laws if
the Secretary determines “there is a pressing need for a procurement of a speciﬁc countermeasure.”117
These simpliﬁed procurement authorities grant an exemption from, for example, the rigid strictures of
the Truth in Negotiations Act, which permits the government to obtain from the oﬀeror on certain sole-
source procurements cost or pricing data revealing nearly all of the oﬀeror’s conﬁdential business information
concerning the oﬀer, including proﬁt margins.118 The Secretary also has authority similar to that of Section
2 to use other than full and open competition if the countermeasure is available from only responsible source
or only from a limited number of responsible sources.119
Section 4: Authorization for Medical Products for Use in Emergencies
The Project BioShield Act allows for the Secretary of HHS to authorize emergency use of products not
approved by the Food and Drug Administration or Health and Human Services.120 The Secretary may
approve an emergency use of a product that is either 1) an unapproved product121 or 2) an unapproved use
of an approved product.122 To exercise this authority the Secretary must ﬁrst determine the existence of
a justifying emergency 1) pursuant to the Public Health Service Act that a public health emergency exists
and that it aﬀects, or has potential to aﬀect national security and involves a speciﬁc biological, chemical,
radiological or nuclear agent; 2) pursuant to a determination by the Secretary of Homeland Security there
115Id.
116Gottron, supra note 82, at 3.
117Project BioShield Act of 2004 §319F-2(c)(7)(C)(ii).
118Rapoport, et al., supra note 69, at 5.
119Project BioShield Act of 2004 §319F-2(c)(7)(C)(iv).
120See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 360bbb-3 (2006).
121A product that not approved, licensed or cleared for commercial distribution. Id. §360bbb-3(a)(2).
122A produce that is approved, licensed or cleared for commercial distribution, but which use is not an approved use. See id.
§360bbb-3(a)(2).
22is a domestic, or is potential for, a domestic emergency, involving heightened risk of attack with a speciﬁed
biological, chemical, radiological or nuclear agent; or 3) pursuant to a determination by the Secretary of
Defense that there is or is potential for a military emergency involving a heightened risk to the United States
military forces of attack with a speciﬁed biological, chemical, radiological or nuclear agent.123
Once the emergency is declared, the Secretary, upon consultation with the Director of the National Institutes
of Health and the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, may issue an authorization
for the emergency use of a product if the Secretary makes certain conclusions. These include: 1) that the
agent causing the emergency can cause serious or life-threatening disease or condition; and 2) that based
on all of the scientiﬁc evidence available, it is reasonable to believe that the product may be eﬀective in
diagnosing, treating, or prevent such disease or condition or another serious or life-threatening disease that
is caused by a product aimed at the ﬁrst disease or condition; and 3) the known and potential beneﬁts of the
product outweigh the known and potential risks of the product; and 4) there is no adequate, approved, and
available alternative to the product; and 5) other criteria that the Secretary may prescribe by regulation.124
Additionally, when authorizing the emergency use of the product, the Secretary, to the extent practicable
given the emergency, must establish conditions to protect health care professionals who administer the
product; to ensure that individuals to whom the product is administered are informed of the known risks
and beneﬁts of the products use, including the option to refuse the product; to monitor and report adverse
events associated with the emergency use of the product; and to direct the manufacturers of the product in
recordkeeping and reporting with respect to emergency use of the product.125 Thus, Project BioShield, within
certain parameters, makes available drugs, devices, or biological products that would otherwise inaccessible
due to their unapproved status.
123Id. §360bbb-3(b)(A) – (C).
124Id. §360bbb-3(c).
125Id. §360bbb-3(e)(1)(A).
23Section 5: Reporting Requirements
Project BioShield requires annual reports to designated congressional committees as well as to the Govern-
ment Accountability Oﬃce (GAO).126 GAO will produce a report four years after the enactment to review
actions taken pursuant to the Act, make recommendations to improve the authorities granted under the Act,
determine the eﬀectiveness of the Act, and recommend additional measures to address deﬁciencies.127
b.
Rationales
The Project BioShield Act of 2004 was lauded as “truly bipartisan work of both bodies [of Congress] across
multiple committees of jurisdiction to protect our country and to promote public health security from the
many new dangers that we face today.”128 In general, members of Congress saw Project BioShield as an
initiative to “spur the research and development of new vaccines, new drugs and other countermeasures
to deal with those biological, chemical, nuclear, or radiological agents that pose a material threat to our
national security.”129 Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist described the bill as, “improve[ing] our ability to
investigate to develop, and to produce these new such countermeasures.”130 He speciﬁcally noted, “For the
ﬁrst time, we have well deﬁned this new paradigm of a public and private partnership working together to
develop these countermeasures in our Nation’s interests.”131
12642 U.S.C. 247d-6c.
127Id. §247d-6c(b).
128150 Cong. Rec. H5721, 5729 (2004) (statement of Rep. Barton).
129Id.
130150 Cong. Rec. S5744, 5760-5761 (2004).
131150 Cong. Rec. S5744, 5761 (2004).
24Other members also referenced the public-private partnership the Project BioShield Act created to develop
these needed products. The sponsor of the House version of Project BioShield, Representative Tauzin,
stated, “This bill seeks to make sure that the private sector does the work along with government to ﬁnd
the antidotes, the treatment for these kinds of agents that might be used in such an attack which might not
otherwise be developed in the private sector.”132 During debate, another member stated, “We have some
incredibly talented people in this country in the public and in the private sector, and this joint partnership
will ensure that we are moving ahead to eﬀectively protect the American people from the potential of a
bioterrorism attack.”133
Constituents from the private sector also praised the government’s involvement in this endeavor. A rep-
resentative from the Advanced Medical Technology Association (“AdvaMed”), before a joint session of the
House Energy and Commerce Health Subcommittee and Select Committee on Homeland Security Emergency
Preparedness and Response Subcommittee stated, “We believe that harnessing the creative abilities of both
the public and private sectors will be necessary to eﬀectively address the bioterrorist threats that we may
face. We believe Project BioShield will allow the public to beneﬁt from the many prevention, detection, and
treatment capabilities our industry can provide. AdvaMed stands ready to work with your committee to
assure the enactment of BioShield legislation consistent with our testimony.134
Calls for the government to create this new market came from representatives of several Executive agencies.
Secretary of Health and Human Services, Tommy Thompson, noted the uniqueness of the situation: “Private
investment should drive the development of most medical products. Bioterrorism, however, is diﬀerent. None
132150 Cong. Rec. H5721, 5730 (2004).
133149 Cong. Rec. H6908, 6933 (2003) (statement of Rep. Langevin).
134Furthering Public Health Security: Project BioShield: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health, H. Energy and Commerce
Comm. and the Subcomm. on Emergency Preparedness and Response, H. Select Homeland Security Comm., 108th Cong. 66
(2003) (statement of Gary Noble, Vice President for Medical and Public Health Aﬀairs, Johnson & Johnson) [hereinafter
Furthering Public Health Security: Project BioShield Hearing].
25of us ever expected that 16th century illnesses and diseases could be used and be weaponized and could be
used as bioterrorist threats in the year 2003 and that’s what we’re facing and there’s no market out there to
develop the vaccines, the anti-viruses, the antidotes and the antibiotics.”135 Similar comments were expressed
by FDA Commissioner, Dr. Mark McClellan: “In some cases, we have done the work to demonstrate safety
and eﬀectiveness of certain products for counterterrorism use, but we don’t yet have companies willing to
produce these products. To bring badly needed safer and more eﬀective countermeasures to our nation’s
defense, we’re going to need to do more to encourage all parties—basic science researchers in government
labs, as well as the major medical companies—to take up the cause of developing countermeasures.”136 The
Director of the National Institutes of Health, Elias Zerhouni, echoed these sentiments, stating in a separate
hearing before the Senate Committee of Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, “I will not repeat the
comments that Dr. McClellan made about the importance of BioShield and the need for us to expand the
current statutory limits on our authority to develop new and innovative approaches for public and private
partnerships that will entice industry to enter the ﬁeld once research has been done to the point where
advanced development of these products is needed.”137
Despite this insistence that the private sector was a necessary partner in the development and production
of biodefense products, some representatives initially questioned the need to create a market for private
pharmaceutical companies rather than directly funding government researchers. For instance, the ranking
member of the Select Committee on Homeland Security, Representative Turner, queried Secretary Thompson
as to whether an alternative structure that would provide “government funded research dollars either to the
private sector to do the research internally, and then once the successful vaccine is discovered to then procure
that through government purchases from the private sector or, in fact, to do it through government labs
135Id. at 15.
136Project BioShield: Contracting for the Health and Security of the American Public: Hearings Before the Comm. on
Government Reform, 108th Cong. 18 (2003).
137Fed. Biodefense Readiness: Hearings before the Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 108th Cong. 13
(2003).
26with private contractors in those labs as we do in some instances now in the military.”138 He speciﬁcally
questioned the assumption that “privately funded research and production is superior to government funded
research and production.”139 Congresswoman Lowey also suggested looking internal to the government: “I
ﬁnd this really upsetting and especially that the large pharmaceutical companies won’t have any interest
because there won’t be enough proﬁt and it seems to me that we may want to look into other ways to
manufacture the product similar to the way the Department of Defense does.”140 She further went on to say
that “it seems unacceptable that the large companies that really can handle this won’t be interested in it and
we have to dig around for some smaller companies who may not have the experience and, as you said, don’t
have the experience to produce this kind of product in the large quantities we need.”141 It was not a given
that Congress was going to look to the private industry to prompt the research and production necessary
to successfully provide comprehensive biodefense. In fact, the House version of the Project BioShield Act
contained a provision that would have allowed the government to directly develop countermeasures.142 This
could be done through several mechanisms including government owned-government operated facilities or
government-owned-contractor operated facilities.143 However, this provision was not included in the Senate
138Furthering Public Health Security: Project BioShield Hearing, supra note 134, at 30.
139Id. Representative Turner went on to suggest, “if we’re truly concerned about getting this job done quickly, it seems
to me that a Manhattan project type approach to it that would utilize government funded research and government funded
production would be perhaps the superior alternative because if you advance contract to a given private company to develop
and then produce by guaranteeing them a market, you may in fact stiﬂe the innovation, that as some member, I believe it was
Mr. Thompson suggested, that if you grant a contract to one company and perhaps another comes up with a better vaccine
then you’ve already committed to spend the money on the inferior vaccine and we’ve wasted a lot of money.” Id.
140Furthering Public Health Security: Project BioShield Hearing, supra note 134, at 42.
141Id. Director Fauci responded directly to Representative Lowey: “Ms. Lowey, not to comment in any way negative or
whatever on the DOD process which in many respects has worked for them, the companies, the Big Pharm as well as the
biotech companies are so good. They are so unparalleled in their capability that I personally feel as a scientist that we must
embrace them in the process. They will do it quicker and better than anyone in the world.” Id. at 44. .
142Project BioShield Act of 2003, H.R. 2122, 108th Cong. §2(c). Representative Brown looked speciﬁcally to the military as
an avenue of research and development. See Furthering Public Health Security: Project BioShield Hearing, supra note 134, at
22. He asked Secretary Thompson to comment on the accomplishments at Walter Reed and the fact that “they have done the
anti-malarial both vaccines and drugs better than any public or private organization in the world over the last 100 years, well
almost certainly. Their budget, however, is only about $20 million. The drug industry says a new drug costs them to develop
about, counting factoring failures into that, about $800 million. Many of us question that number but it’s certainly multiples
of the budget of Walter Reed.” Id.
143Gottron and Fischer, supra note 39.
27version of the Act, which was eventually adopted.144
Ultimately, Congress recognized its essential role in providing needed incentives to the private sector for
it to accomplish governmental priorities that would otherwise be neglected. The special reserve fund was
created to be a pool of money only available for the procurement of these speciﬁc products that had been
pre-identiﬁed as necessary to meet material threats that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in conjunction
with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, had identiﬁed.145 Because the money was obligated
in advance, once the President approved the call for a security countermeasure, private pharmaceutical
companies could be sure of a market for the fruits of their labor. As one Representative saw it, the special
reserve fund was the most important feature of the Act because, “without this clear commitment of funding
in future years, private sector companies that are capable of such development will not undertake the heavy
investment and risk associated with developing products that deal with agents that do not aﬀect signiﬁcant
populations today and hopefully never will.”146 As Dr. Fauci—when describing the types of pharmaceutical
companies the bill was intended to attract—so succinctly put it, “Many of these ﬁrms are willing to help in
the development of biodefense countermeasures, but the fact remains that they are businesses and are not
non-proﬁt organizations. And they need a tangible incentive to get involved.”147
Proponents of the legislation intended to create a market where none existed. However, Congress refused
to give a black check to the Executive branch for the procurement of countermeasures. The original bill as
144See Project BioShield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (2004).
145H.R. Rep. No.108-147, pt 1, at 16. (“However, the Committee emphasizes that the monies obligated from the special
reserve fund created under section 3 of this Act may not be use[d] to pay for research and development activities, but only for
procurement of countermeasures paid upon substantial delivery of the product...”).
146150 Cong. Rec. H5721, 5729 (2004) (statement of Rep. Barton).
147Project BioShield: Contracting for the Health and Security of the American Public Hearing, supra note 44, at 16 (statement
of Dr. Anthony Fauci, Director, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases).
28reported in the Senate contained a provision that would grant indeﬁnite appropriation for the purchasing
of countermeasures to be spent at the President’s discretion.148 During the ﬁrst committee hearing on the
bill, Representative Dingell, the Ranking Member of the Energy and Commerce Committee, asked about
what he called “unlimited, unfettered future appropriations without limits and without constraints.”149 He
went on to call the provision “a blank check of the most extraordinary character that I have ever seen.”150
Secretary Thompson defended the President’s original proposal maintaining that the mandatory funding
was necessary to create the market.151 “You got to be able to manufacture it and unless there’s mandatory
funding,” he went on, “there’s less likelihood that the company will want to go through that unless they
know they’re assured of the money, they’re assured of the possibility of having that valid contract. That’s
why the mandatory versus the discretion.152 The Secretary then gave of an example of an incident of
discretionary funding allocated for developing a new anthrax drug that was then taken away in the budget
appropriation.153 However, after the House version of the bill passed, but before ﬂoor debate in the Senate
could begin, Senator Byrd put a hold on the bill, objecting to the way it would take control over spending
out of the hands of appropriators.154 He, along with other legislators, persuaded the Senate to adopt an
amendment that stripped the guaranteed funding from the program.155 The ﬁnal bill—S.15—as enacted did
not give the President a “blank check,” but rather authorized to be appropriated $5.6 billion—the amount the
administration predicted that would be spent through ﬁscal year 2013 on countermeasure procurement.156
Whether or not the incentives would be suﬃcient—mandatory or not—to entice the private sector was left
148Gottron and Fischer, supra note 39, at 5.
149Furthering Public Health Security: Project BioShield Hearing, supra note 134, at 9.
150Id.
151Id. at 22.
152Id.
153Id.
154Kate Schuler, BioShield Bill Breaks Free in Senate, Expected to Reach President’s Desk Soon After Memorial Day Recess,
Cong. Q. Wkly., May 22, 2004, at 1215.
155Id.
156Gottron and Fischer, supra note 39, at 5. Representative Dingell remained committed to the a bill that followed the
normal appropriations process and in debate on the bill in the House stated, “Finally, I commend Chairman Tauzin of the
Committee on Energy and Commerce and my other colleagues for deciding to proceed with an authorization for funding, rather
than with the mandatory appropriation sought by the Administration.” 149 Cong. Rec. H6908, 6940 (2003).
29an open question.
Those members deliberating the Act knew that manufacturer liability was an issue. In discussing Section
319F-2(c)(4)(B), which provides that the Secretaries of HHS and DHS should include in any call for proposals
for countermeasure production information that may be necessary to encourage or facilitate research and
development into such countermeasures, the Committee on Energy and Commerce “recognize[d] that an
important factor companies will consider in determining whether to invest scarce research and development
dollars into security countermeasures is whether and to what extent they may face liability relating to the
development or production of such countermeasures.”157 While liability guidelines were not part of the bill,
“the Committee...encourage[d] the Secretaries to indicate in any call for proposals the potential availability
of indemniﬁcation or liability protections under other laws.”158
The need for liability protections was pointed out during committee hearings and Congressional debates.
One representative from the private pharmaceutical industry noted that the bill overall did not adequately
take into account the high-risk and costly process of bringing new medicines to the market, speciﬁcally, “the
time consuming and resource intensive middle part of the process.”159 He pointed to challenges inherent
in biodefense-related research and development, noting that some products will be distributed without
the typical battery of clinical trials that are required for medical approval, and, given that all medicines
present an inherent and unavoidable risk of adverse events, “manufacturers may be exposed to devastating
product liability suits and...not only the companies but also those patients who receive it and those people
who administer these treatments also may be aﬀected by those suits. Private insurance may simply be
157H.R. Rep. No 108-147, pt. 1 at 15.
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159Furthering Public Health Security: Project BioShield Hearing, supra note 134, at 58 (2003) (statement of Dr. Michael
Friedman, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association of America).
30unavailable.”160 Another witness explained “that from the point of view of a small company, it isn’t even a
meritorious legal case that is a threat. Even just the threat itself of liability is enough to prevent investment
and put small companies out of business. So this is a risk that small companies simply can’t take.”161
Congress members listened and acknowledged these repeated appeals from the private industry to strengthen
liability protections, but did not put any in the bill.
Continued concerns about the absence of liability protections both for the private pharmaceutical compa-
nies developing and procuring countermeasures, as well as for the public health administrators who would
ultimately deliver the vaccines, were voiced. In debate, one member noted, “I am very concerned that
the liability provisions in this bill are not suﬃciently protective of the companies that would step forward
to address the need to create these BioShield defenses. I am not at all convinced that the immunity is
broad enough or dependable enough.”162 But even that member left it for another day, ominously fore-
casting, “Time will tell.”163 Representative Davis, Chairman of the House Government Reform Committee,
explained that liability protection would be an incentive for companies that “are going to be engaging in
research and development and manufacture things that they didn’t do otherwise” Thus, because he saw it
as Congress’ mission to get companies to engage in that research and development, it was important to be
aware that if those companies were exposed to massive lawsuits, “it could bankrupt the entire company and
expose the rest of its business.”164
Congressman Waxman framed the issue a little diﬀerently by bringing up the issue of compensation for
160Id.
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of Dr. Una S. Ryan, President, Avant Immunotherapeutics).
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31those who would be harmed by products made by indemniﬁed companies. He somewhat rhetorically asked
Commissioner McClellan of the FDA, if Congress is “going to indemnify the companies that manufacture
countermeasures by providing the liability protection, some of those products still may harm consumers. If
the administration can guarantee liability protection to manufacturers, shouldn’t it also compensate those
who are injured by the products?”165 He brought up the issue again with Dr. Friedman of the Pharma-
ceutical Research and Manufacturers Association, who added that indemnity should be available for “the
people who are delivering the product—that is the health care providers—physicians and so forth.”166 Then
Congressman Waxman summed up: “So you think the manufacturers should be protected from liability to
give the incentive to develop these products, but the public that’s exposed to them that may have some
adverse eﬀects should also be compensated?”167 Thus, despite the obvious need for some kind of liability
and compensation provisions that not only witnesses representing the pharmaceutical industry noted, but
also many members of Congress, there were no such provisions enacted as part of the Project BioShield Act
of 2004.
Many members of Congress also recognized that some of the provisions of BioShield—particularly those
allowing the Secretary to authorize the use of unapproved products and to make procurement contracts
with less than open competition—were extreme. Both Congresswoman Maloney and Congressman Wax-
man observed that “provisions of BioShield authorizing the emergency distribution of unapproved drugs
and devices, whose risks and beneﬁts are not fully tested, impose an unprecedented responsibility on the
government.”168 They directed that the “FDA must be vigilant in protecting the public against unnecessary
risks from these products. In part because of these concerns, the bill requires that health care providers and
165Id. at 61.
166Id. at 114.
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32patients be informed that the products have not been approved and be informed of their risks.”169 During
debate, Congressman Langevin, declared:
“[u]nder this program, the Federal government will be able to enhance the Strategic National
Stockpile, promote research and development of countermeasures, and, in an emergency,
move forward with public distribution of certain drugs and treatments that may not yet have
FDA approval. It is never pleasant to imagine a scenario where this kind of preparation and
ﬂexibility will be necessary, but the threat is indeed there. Project BioShield will help lay
the groundwork to respond to that threat quickly and eﬀectively.”170 In the Senate, Senator
Gregg described the procedure for circumventing the FDA review process as only available
in “certain very limited situations where there is a clear and obvious emergency...where
speciﬁcally we have been attacked.171
There is no indication that any members of Congress were contemplating less than a real emergency situation
for the FDA to allow for the administration of a product for an unapproved use or use of an unapproved
product.172
Similarly, legislators did not believe that the government’s ability to use accelerated procedures, such as
less than full and open competition, were to be used on any kind of regular basis. Representative Maloney
acknowledged the ability to use these procedures, but only if there exists a “pressing need to do so.”173
169Id.
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33Senator Levin likewise saw the norm as a procurement process subject to full and open competition “unless
the Secretary determines that the mission of the BioShield program would be seriously impaired by this
requirement. This provision ensures that the BioShield program, like other Federal programs, will be subject
to government wide competition requirements.”174 It therefore appears that members of Congress envisioned
these provisions to be used only in specially-warranting situations.
Project BioShield was not intended to come at the expense of other public health initiatives. Congressman
Brown exclaimed that “Project BioShield is not a blank check. Congress has a responsibility to weigh
competing priorities and set funding levels appropriately.” He asserted that while “Bioterrorism funding is
certainly important...it must not come at the expense of research on cancer and research on Alzheimer’s
and muscular dystrophy and AIDS and other signiﬁcant health threats.”175 He speciﬁcally rejected the idea
of putting money into BioShield if it were to mean “diverting [it] from other promising medical research, TB,
multiple sclerosis, all other kinds of medical research.” The Congressman was resolute that trade-oﬀs were
unacceptable: “trade-oﬀs that set back the clock on cures for deadly and disabling diseases; trade-oﬀs the
public did not bargain for and should not abide...The last thing Congress or the President should do is assure
the public that we are doing everything we can more than ever to ﬁnd cures for major illnesses like cancer and
Parkinson’s when actually we are choking oﬀ funding for medical research.”176 Representative Jackson-Lee
pointed out that the deliberate spread of HIV/AIDS could also be seen as an act of bioterrorism.177 She
directed her colleagues not to forget “the other preventable diseases or other contagious diseases and the
other work of NIH so that we are assured that we are protecting the homeland in many ways. We must seek
to balance the fear of the American people with the health needs of the American people.”178
174150 Cong. Rec. S5744, 5767 (2004).
175150 Cong. Rec. H5721, 5730 (2004).
176Id.
177Id. at 57234.
178Id.
34Even as the Project BioShield Act reﬂected an innovative attempt to foster a practically nonexistent industry
and provide for greater authority and ﬂexibility to provide countermeasures against a biological or other
attack, it was subject to a variety of limitations. Some of the limitations of the legislation—such as the
omission of liability and compensation provisions—come from the inherent inadequacy of the bill itself,
while others were deliberately imposed by Congress so as not to harm other interests—such as established
appropriations and drug approval procedures as well as public health research and development initiatives.
The law was thus a inventive balance between many competing priorities and it should come as little surprise
that its implementation has been subject to a great deal of criticism.
III.
Implementation and Implementation Problems
Legislators had high hopes for accomplishments stimulated by Project Bioshield. President Bush, in a Rose
Garden ceremony, when signing the bill into law, proclaimed, “By acting today we are making sure we
have the best medicine possible to help the victims of a biological attack. Project Bioshield is part of a
boarder strategy to defend America against the threats of weapons of mass destructions.179 He highlighted
that with the $5.6 billion authorized by Project Bioshield, the government, acting as a willing buyer for the
best new medical technologies, would be ensuring that America’s drug stockpile remains safe, eﬀective, and
advanced.180 Yet critics have voiced concerns about many of the provisions of Project Bioshield. Despite
a few procurement accomplishments under the Act, it has not brought about the lofty ambitions of the
legislators who passed it. First, the government simply has failed to dedicate funds and award contracts.
And the one company that has been awarded a contract has failed to perform. The failure to award contracts
179Statement By President George W. Bush Upon Signing S. 15, 40 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1346-1347 (July 21, 2004).
180Id.
35stems, in part, from bureaucratic red-tape and the government’s inability to make clear its expectations under
the Act. Next, the Act has outraged the very scientists who were intended to accomplish the essential research
and development to create new countermeasures. These scientists, along with others, feel that Congress has
misplaced priorities, concentrating too much on low risk events rather than other meta-problems in the public
health structure and naturally occurring epidemics. Private drug companies have largely found the deal not
to be sweet enough to participate, complaining of the insuﬃciency of funding and the lack of indemniﬁcation
provisions.
a.
The VaxGen Failure
The largest contract awarded pursuant to the Project Bioshield Act has been to VaxGen, Inc., for 75 million
doses of a next-generation anthrax vaccine. This was the ﬁrst countermeasure contract from BioShield’s
special reserve fund.181 The VaxGen contract is valued at $877.5 million, the equivalent of about ﬁfteen
percent of the amount appropriated for BioShield over the next ten years.182 The contract provides for the
payment of $754 million in advance of speciﬁc milestones; when and if the milestones are accomplished,
VaxGen will receive speciﬁed per dose price supplements.183 The Secretary of HHS elected not to use
simpliﬁed acquisition procedures with respect to this contract.184
NIH spelled out a demanding schedule for the anthrax-vaccine bidders, such as delivering early trial results
181Frank Rappaport, et al., supra note 69, at 5
182Id. at 6.
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36by the end of 2003.185 A predecessor of the drug giant Sanoﬁ-Aventis, SA declared this timetable impossible
to meet and was disqualiﬁed from early funding.186 VaxGen reported a failure in a major human test and
is at least a year behind schedule, with some estimating delivery will not be accomplished until 2008 or
2009, long after the anthrax attacks of 2001 prompted the government to desire a better defense.187 Given
the VaxGen delay, the government recently purchased ﬁve million doses of an older, controversial anthrax
vaccine—enough to treat fewer than two million people.188 And now, VaxGen is being investigated by the
FDA for making “false and misleading statements” about the vaccine that were not warranted on the basis
of early research.189 The FDA has threatened court action unless VaxGen devises a plan to disseminate
truthful, non-misleading, and complete information about the vaccine to anyone who might have received
the original problematic claims—including thousands of individual stockholders.190 Representative Cannon
prompted the Director of National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), Anthony Fauci, to
admit that in regards to the next-generation anthrax contract, “the other companies refused to bid because
it was not feasible to do it in the timeframes...suggested, and so now we have a small company failing to
perform in an area where we...have an experimental technology to deal with a disease that we have already
been attacked with, it has already been a bioterrorist tool, attacked several times with, and yet we don’t have
a stockpile, even though my understanding is that we have a company that has an FDA-approved vaccine
for anthrax.”191
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37b.
Complex Government Bureaucracy
The issues with VaxGen are emblematic of the larger problems in the BioShield process. Like many other
federal government undertakings, the execution of the Project BioShield Act has been hampered by diﬃcult
and confusing bureaucracy. In Congressional hearings, executives from biotech companies have criticized
the BioShield process as “anything but the red-tape-free haven” that was originally envisioned.192 The
executives say that government oﬃcials keep changing the requirements and delaying contracts.193 During
his opening statement, when calling to order a hearing of the Education, Labor and Pensions Committee,
Senator Burr remarked, “It is also not clear if the implementation of the BioShield Act has resulted in a
predictable procurement process that ensures the companies and others know what kind of countermeasures
the government and nation needs and how much.” He then quoted the CEO of a biotech ﬁrm who termed
the process of bringing new countermeasures to the stockpile, “potholes in the road to BioShield.”194 Critics
say that the government has been “coy—even evasive—about what products it wants to purchase and at
what price.”195
An executive from one company noted the many challenges faced by his organization post-enactment, not-
ing speciﬁcally, “What we haven’t been able to meet and what we can’t ﬁgure out are the bureaucratic
confusion—or...the gaps that exist between BioShield and the real world.”196 He told the Subcommittee
on Bioterrorism and Public Health Preparedness:
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38The perception of the process of BioShield, of BioShield acquisition, is a complete black box:
It’s not understood by industry, it’s not understood by the street, companies shy away from
participating in BioShield because it’s considered to be too diﬃcult or perhaps too mystery-
endowed to be worthwhile for a company to risk its assets moving forward with a BioShield
product.197
Oﬃcials from the private companies the bill was intended to attract repeated these themes to legislators.
One pharmaceutical executive said, “I’d characterize HHS as unengaged, almost apologetics, hostile...every
question we asked, we were told, ‘We can’t talk about it.”’198 The CEO of another company that possesses
a drug “with potential to treat acute radiation syndrome” said that, despite the phenomenal progress with
his drug and “the suitability for a BioShield contract, we have heard very little from the federal government
in regards to procurement of this drug.”199 This has had concrete consequences for his company, noting,
“we don’t know how to scale our batch sizes, what drug delivery conﬁguration is preferred or how many
manufacturers we should validate,” he went on to explain, “these activities cost tens of millions of dollars and
have reached the point where decisions have to be made or the project risks meaningful delays.”200 And, even
more problematic, he reported “delays by HHS have caused Hollis-Eden to lose approximately $600 million
in market capitalization.”201 He suggested that “the individuals who are implementing [Project BioShield]
have made up the rules as we go along,”202 and recommended “more open dialogue, clear transparency and
guidelines, so that the people implementing the bill are directly interfacing with industry representatives, so
the process is transparent and everyone knows what’s expected of one another.”203
198Adams, supra note 195, at 234.
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39c.
Priorities
i.
Public health system
The Project Bioshield Act is aimed particularly at the creation of countermeasures and not the general public
health infrastructure. Several members of Congress have pointed out that, without and eﬀective delivery
system, it will not actually matter how much of any particular vaccine the government has stockpiled.
As one Representative astutely pointed out, “not only is it possible that hundreds of millions of dollars
could be spent to develop a medicine or vaccine and it be totally useless, but the very best of medicines,
vaccines or other agents will be worthless to you, me and the people we serve without an intact public
health system.”204 Even Senator Frist pointed out, that there “are other initiatives such as strengthening
our public health system,” which he noted, “has been neglected over the last 25 or 30 years. That public
health system, that public health infrastructure, is the frontline in response to these agents.”205 And
Senator Kennedy, who noted before the passage of the Act that “The Institute of Medicine in 2003 found
that America’s health agencies have ‘vulnerable and outdated health information systems and technologies,
an insuﬃcient and inadequately trained public health workforce, antiquated laboratory capacity, a lack of
realtime surveillance in epidemiological systems, an ineﬀective and fragmented communications network,
incomplete domestic preparedness and emergency response capabilities, and communities without access to
204150 Cong. Rec. H5721, 5738 (2004) (statement of Rep. Christensen). This Representative went on to detail how the
administration’s decision to not fund health care resulted in “health care disparities in minorities and in our rural areas.” Id.
She appealed to the Speaker, “We cannot just throw money at the problem of terrorism, as this administration has the tendency
to do, without adequate planning. In this case, we must ﬁrst and foremost insist that our public health system is intact and
that it can ensure that people are healthy and our bodies are in a better condition to ﬁght oﬀ infections and the other biological
assaults that may come from a bioterrorism attack.” Id. at H5739.
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40essential public health services.”’206 Eight months after the Act was signed into law, he continued with the
same message, directing his colleagues to “recognize that even the best new treatments will do little good
if our emergency rooms are so overburdened that doctors and nurses cannot deliver the eﬀective care. The
most modern disease-monitoring system will be of little use if public health agencies are so starved [for]
funds they cannot keep their communities safe.207
Bioshield, by exclusively focusing on incentives needed to encourage private pharmaceutical companies to
develop bioterror countermeasures, does not focus on this public health infrastructure. However, stockpiles
alone cannot equip communities for the full array of functions needed to detect and respond to a bioterrorist
attack.208 Some experts have predicted that “[n]ew equipment, communications systems, laboratories, hos-
pital surge capacity, and training and public administration skills will be needed for local law enforcement,
ﬁrst responders, public oﬃcials, and hospitals to be able to accurately detect a bioattack, properly handle
the victims, eﬃciently move large quantities of drugs to attack zones, diagnose and treat exotic diseases,
and maintain order and execute quarantine or evacuation plans. To operationalize this new arsenal of drugs,
America will require a variety of ancillary products, services, and expertise...”209
ii.
Naturally-Occurring Diseases and Pathogens
One criticism leveled at the entire BioShield program is that is prioritizes possible bioterrorism low-risk
threats over more likely naturally occurring dangers. In the process, the administration is transforming NIH
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41from a civilian research institution into part of the machinery of the nation’s homeland defense system.210
In other words, in the place of NIH’s long-time focus mainly on curing naturally occurring diseases, NIH
is increasingly geared to defending against manmade biological threats.211 A group of 758 scientists wrote
an open latter to Elias Zerhoni, Director of NIH, describing their dissatisfaction with the shift in priorities.
They wrote: “the decision by the [NIAID] to prioritize the research of high biodefense, but low public health
signiﬁcance” threatens the NIH peer review process and the research sector.212 The result of the shift in
priorities, they said, “has been a massive inﬂux of funding, institutions, and investigators into work on
prioritized bioweapons agents...The number of grants awarded by NIAID that reference these agents has
increased by 1500%.”213 This increase is in contrast to “the massive eﬄux of funding, institutions, and
investigators from work on non-biodefense-related [work]...This diversion of research funds from projects
of high health importance to projects of high biodefense but low public-health importance represents a
misdirection of NIH priorities and a crisis for NIH-supported microbiological research.”214 Dr. Ebright, a
molecular biologist at Rutgers University, who was the primary organizer of the petition, explained in a
interview, “A majority of the nation’s top microbiologists—the very group that the Bush administration is
counting on to carry out its biodefense research agenda—dispute the premises and implementation of the
biodefense spending.”215 In another interview he bluntly stated that “there’s a lot of money we scientists
see being spent in a manner that serves no scientiﬁc of public health purpose.”216
A growing number of scientists such as these worry that biodefense work is siphoning resources from research
on AIDS, bacterial pneumonia, malaria and other diseases that aﬀect millions of people every year.217 As
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211Id.
212Sidney Altman, et al., An Open Letter to Elias Zerhouni, 307 Science 1409 (2005)
213Id.
214Id.
215Scott Shane, U.S. Germ-Research Policy is Protested by 758 Scientists, N.Y. TIMES, March 1, 2005, at A14.
216Betelheim, supra note 210.
217Id.
42one researcher put it, “The question is, do you really want to remove resources from areas like that to put
them into a threat that may never materialize.”218 Critics note that the pie is shrinking, even as NIH defense
spending continues to rise.219 The institutes’ total 2006 budget actually declined a tenth of a percent from
2005 levels, marking the ﬁrst such cut since 1970.220 In fact, this will be the third year that NIH will lose
ground due to inﬂation; the Bush administration requested $28.6 billion for NIH, the same funding it received
for ﬁscal year 2006.221 The ranking member of the House Appropriations Committee, David Obey, pointed
out that that ﬁgure results in a $1 billion of lost purchasing power resulting in 655 fewer research grants than
ﬁscal year 2006 and 1,570 few than in 2004.222 The budget for NIH’s largest institute, the National Cancer
Institute, rose about two percent in 2005, but was held ﬂat for 2006.223 Other divisions, such as the National
Heart, Lunch and Institute and the National Institute of Mental Health, are in similar situations.224 Thus,
it is no wonder that conﬂicts are arising between new biodefense priorities and long-standing eﬀorts, such as
developing drugs to combat Alzheimer’s, diabetes, stroke, Parkinson’s and arthritis.
However, Eliah Zerhouni and Anthony Fauci, the directors of the NIH and NIAID respectively, refute these
claims. In a response to the open letter, the directors asserted that “funding for biodefense research has been
additive to nonbiodefense research eﬀorts supported by NIAID.”225 Further, they maintained in the response,
“with the establishment of the designation of biodefense money, studies of many pathogens previously funded
from the general pool of microbiology money were funded by biodefense money, allow additional grants for
nonbiodefense pathogens.”226 They also attacked the accounting methodology of the authors of the letter
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43because it only took into account a fraction of the overall biodefense and nonbiodefense programs at NIH.227
And, they speciﬁcally took issue with the scientists’ designation of biodefense concerns being of “low public
health signiﬁcance.”228
Dr. Fauci perceives naturally occurring diseases and bioterror threats as pieces of the same pie: “the way
NIAID look[s] at the scientiﬁc component of it is that we have a big program what we call emerging and
reemerging diseases and from the scientiﬁc standpoint a deliberately released microbe is just another form
of an emerging and reemerging disease.”229 He also sees crossovers between the “expertise...for biodefense”
and “something like SARS...pandemic ﬂu or a variety of other issues.”230 Thus a reallocation of funding is
likely less problematic to him than the scientists who work on niche topics because there are overall beneﬁts
derived from biodefense research.
d.
Incentives Not Adequate
i.
Funding
Unfortunately, regardless of any debates about the relative funding of biodefense prerogatives versus other
public health research, the incentives provided by the Project Bioshield Act have largely not been enough
to attract the private pharmaceutical industry. While $5.6 billion sounds like a lot of money it is spread out
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44over ten years and is not much in the context of the vast expenditures on pharmaceuticals in the U.S.231
In fact, the appropriated amount comes out to only $20 per person.232 In a hearing last month, Richard
Falkenrath of the Brookings Institution reported to the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions
Committee that “the pharmaceutical industry has not yet been eﬀectively mobilized to this task. Everyone
understands that.”233 Most of the nation’s biggest drug companies have avoided the program, seeing little
proﬁt but big risk to their reputations if they cannot carry out a high-proﬁle government contract.234 A
representative from one pharmaceutical company stated succinctly, big companies “cannot make the type of
proﬁts” necessary to invest in the research the government hoped they would.235 The government instead
has had to depend on small, ﬁnancially shaky biotechnology companies.236
The Secretary of HHS lacks the ability to use public funds extensively to shore up companies. The Secretary
can pay them up to ten percent of the value of a contract in advance, and companies can get research subsidies
early in a project, but the rest has to wait until they deliver the product.237 Thus companies themselves
must ﬁnance the expensive middle stages—between the time of proof of scientiﬁc principle and the time when
a product is ready to be considered for BioShield—largely on their own.238 Biotech companies have dubbed
that ﬁnancing gap the “Valley of Death.”239 A lack of funding for advanced development at this critical
stage stalls many promising drugs and vaccines in the lab.240 The President and Chief Operating Oﬃcer
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45of one small pharmaceutical company illustrated this point, explaining that, “we, as a small company, look
to the capital markets for our funding. Speciﬁcally we raise money through sales of stock. We don’t have
any sales so we can’t contribute revenues to government research. The money we get in the capital markets
is operating capital; it’s not for government seed funding. Therefore, the possibility exists that promising
products—for example, our Ebola product—could die on the vine simply because, while it’s been proven
scientiﬁcally, it’s not far enough along for BioShield.”241
This so-called “Valley of Death” is exactly what NIAID Director Fauci has been trying to combat. He has
been investing money in start-up drug companies “betting” that they will come up with needed vaccines and
other countermeasures.242 Using NIAID biodefense funding, he “seeks to place bets on multiple companies
in the hopes of hitting the jackpot and to dole out the NIH’s money in multiple rounds, using milestones
to gauge progress.”243 He funds rivals, hoping to get them ready to bid against each other for BioShield
contracts.244 Yet his detractors have called him a “venture capitalist,” a role inappropriate for the director
of a government agency.245 And, companies that have not been awarded funds feel that there is a “Fauci
Club” of favorites.246 They worry that without this NIH funding, they will not have the inside track for
BioShield.247 Potential preferences aside, it is not clear how ﬂedging biotech companies would be able to
raise the needed capital to overcome the “Valley of Death” without this inﬂux of capital. Whereas some
could argue that it is for Congress to explicitly authorize a mechanism to deal with the “Valley of Death”
syndrome, Dr. Fauci is unquestionably attempting to further the underlying goals of the Act—generating
countermeasures—by getting companies to where they need to be in order to make this a reality.
Fix Health Issues, Roll Call, March 13, 2006.
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46ii.
Liability
The fact that the Project Bioshield Act omits any type of liability protection for manufacturers or adminis-
trators of countermeasures has completely repelled the private pharmaceutical industry. The viability of any
of the hoped for research and development programs is in doubt if there is not adequate ﬁnancial support to
protect vaccine manufacturers, sellers, and distributors from liability, and to compensate those injured by the
vaccines.248 Oﬃcials from the pharmaceutical industry have repeatedly and vigorously stressed that liability
is of paramount importance.249 “More important though,” said the CEO of AVI Biopharma, “than [other]
incentives [is] the liability protection.”250 Director Fauci summed up at a hearing last year: “I think there’s
universal agreement that we need to address the liability issue better than it’s being addressed currently.251
e.
FDA Emergency Use Authorization
In February 2005, the FDA issued the First Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) under the Project BioShield
Act.252 The EUA was issued after a federal court enjoined the Department of Defense’s (DOD) involuntary
anthrax vaccination program on the grounds that the FDA approval of the drug had violated the Admin-
248Melanie Santiago, Eliminating Legal, Regulatory, and Economic Barriers to Biodefense Vaccine Development”: Introduc-
tion, 8 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 1, 2 (2005).
249Michael Barbaro, BioShield Too Little for Drug Industry; Companies Want More Protection from Financial Loss, Wash.
Post, July 26, 2004, at E01. (“Executives say, Bioshield doesn’t remove all the uncertainties of developing the drugs. They
complain that it does not oﬀer complete liability protection should a drug have adverse eﬀects on patients or fail to protect
them against a pathogen, which could lead to lawsuits.”).
250Bioshield II: Responding to an Ever-Changing Threat: Joint Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary and Comm.
on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 108th Cong. 11 (2004) (testimony of Alan Timmins, CEO, AVI BioPharma)
[hereinafter Bioshield II: Responding to an Ever-Changing Threat Hearing].
251Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack Hearing: “Implementing the National Biodefense Strategy,”
109th Cong. 21 (2005).
252Authorization of Emergency Use of Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed for Prevention of Inhalation Anthrax by Individuals at
Heightened Risk of Exposure Due to Attack with Anthrax; Availability, 70 Fed. Reg. 5452 (Feb. 2, 2005).
47istrative Procedure Act.253 The court held that “unless and until FDA follows the correct procedures to
certify [the vaccine] as a safe and eﬀective drug for its intended use, defendant DOD may no longer subject
military personnel to involuntary anthrax vaccinations absent informed consent or a Presidential waiver.”254
DOD then returned to federal court seeking to modify the injunction to clarify that “defendant can admin-
ister [the vaccine] even in the absence of FDA approval of the drug: that is, pursuant to an [EUA] under
the Project Bioshield Act of 2004.”255 The court subsequently modiﬁed its injunction to allow DOD to
administer the vaccine, on a voluntary basis, pursuant to a lawful EUA.256 The court expressly reserved
judgment on the lawfulness of any EUA.257 Pending the opinion, the FDA did issue a EUA, pursuant to the
request of DOD, for individuals DOD deemed to be at a “heightened risk of exposure due to attack with
inhalation anthrax.”258 As a condition of the EUA, the FDA required that DOD provide service members
with both an option to refuse the vaccine and a specially-designed information sheet about the risks and
beneﬁts of vaccine.259 The FDA also required DOD to report any adverse events associated with the vaccine
to the FDA.260
The basis for DOD’s decision to administer the anthrax vaccine to military forces is largely classiﬁed, thus it
is diﬃcult to judge the Secretary of Defense’s determination that such vaccination was necessary. However,
based on the legislative history of the Project BioShield Act, it does not appear that the EUA provisions were
intended to be used as an ex post justiﬁcation to vaccinate the armed forces without individualized consent.
The Project BioShield Act in fact requires that regulations be established to ensure that individuals to whom
an unapproved product is administered are informed of the known risks and beneﬁts of the product’s use,
253Doe v. Rumsfeld, 341 F. Supp. 2d 1 (2004).
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48including the option to refuse the product. Hence, the court made the correct ruling when it held that a
properly issued EUA would be lawful if the administration of the vaccine were subject to informed consent
by members of the armed services. No other EUAs have been issued pursuant to the Project Bioshield Act
of 2004.
IV.
Alternatives and Improvements
Given these implementation problems with the Project Bioshield Act of 2004, critics have suggested alter-
natives to and improvements upon the Act’s provisions. Congress has held an extensive set of hearings to
determine what kinds of developments in the law are needed to foster the type of market originally envi-
sioned. As discussed in the previous section, there are four primary—though related—areas that any further
Congressional action on BioShield should take into account: 1) confusing government bureaucracy, 2) other
public health priorities, 3) overall incentives for private sector participation, and 4) liability for manufac-
turers and administrators of countermeasures. This section will ﬁrst discuss existing statutory models for a
scheme of government indemniﬁcation and then turn to the BioShield II bill, which has been introduced in
the 109th Congress as a means to advance the original goals of the Project BioShield Act of 2004.
a.
Liability and Compensation Models
There already exist statutory models for government indemniﬁcation of activities related to vaccine manu-
facture and administration. The ﬁrst such a program was the National Swine Flu Immunization Program
49of 1976.261 Concerns over manufacturer liability arose when insurers said they would end coverage for vac-
cine manufactures because of lawsuits.262 Congress eventually responded by passing the Swine Flu Act to
provide liability protection for the vaccine manufacturers, distributors and administrators, as well as com-
pensation for those harmed by the vaccine.263 The Act established a no fault compensation system for any
plaintiﬀ who could demonstrate that their injuries were causally linked to the vaccine.264 The Swine Flu
Act substituted the United States as the defendant via the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), rather than
the alleged wrongdoer.265 However, the government could then seek compensation from manufacturer from
negligent organizations or individuals.266 The federal government ultimately paid out more than $90 million
to ailments related to the Swine Flu vaccine, thus becoming reluctant to assume this large ﬁnancial risk in
the future.267
Another statutory model that has been lauded as an example to be followed with respect to BioShield
indemniﬁcation is the National Childhood Vaccine Act of 1986 (NCVIA).268 The provisions of this Act
are diﬀerent from the Swine Flu Act. The NCVIA set up a two-staged, no fault compensation system for
speciﬁc childhood vaccines.269 The ﬁrst stage is an administrative remedy where the plaintiﬀ went before
a special master of the United States district court to recover based on injuries resulting from childhood
vaccination.270 These injuries however, are capped and thus, the second stage allows for plaintiﬀs to bring
261National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, 94 P.L. 380, 90 Stat. 1113 (1976).
262Michael Greenberger, The 800 Pound Gorilla Sleeps: The Federal Government’s Lackadaisical Liability and Compensation
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50a traditional tort suit against the manufacturer, subject to certain limitations.271
Experts testifying before Congress have looked to the NCVIA as a model for liability protections for compa-
nies that produce countermeasures pursuant to Project BioShield. Senator Burr speciﬁcally inquired of one
such expert who was before the Subcommittee on Bioterrorism and Public Health Preparedness, “You also
mentioned indemniﬁcation, and I guess I’d ask you, what type of liability provisions do you believe we should
have?”272 The expert responded, saying “I would mention that the children’s vaccine fund, the process that
indemniﬁes [a] company for children’s vaccines, I think is a model that should be looked at seriously in
this regard.”273 Another expert recommended that the program be “modernized and strengthened,” but
that any program to address immunizations in the face of a widespread outbreak should...separate...and
encompass all circumstances where mass emergency immunization would be necessary.”274
Another liability program was established incident to the Phase I Smallpox Vaccination Program. Announced
by President Bush in December 2002, this program was intended to vaccinate 500,000 ﬁrst responders against
smallpox.275 The program utilized Section 304 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002276 to provide protection;
however, “the liability protection aﬀorded was ambiguous and the compensation available to those injured
was inadequate.”277 Congress attempted to reinvigorate this liability and compensation scheme and thereby
increase the number of vaccinees by passing the Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act of 2003
(SEPPA).278 SEPPA created a no-fault compensation system that broadened liability coverage, speciﬁcally
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51healthcare entities, but was subject to certain limitations like caps on awards.279 However, the remedies as
a whole were not suﬃcient to make the smallpox initiative successful.280
The ﬁnal statutory example is the recently enacted Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Eﬀective Tech-
nologies Act (SAFTEY Act).281 The SAFETY Act is, however, inappropriate for indemniﬁcation of coun-
termeasures because that was not the intent of the Act, the Act is overly burdensome, and the liability
protection is too broad at the expense of those to be compensated by the Act.282 Even if the SAFETY
Act were applicable to biodefense vaccines, the procedural and insurance requirements are too burdensome
so that it would be “virtually impossible to obtain vaccine liability protection under the Act.”283 Michael
Greenberger, of the University of Maryland Center for Health and Homeland Security, oﬀered an extensive
analysis of the hoops through which a company would have to go through in order to meet the criteria for
liability coverage eligibility. First, the seller of the countermeasure must receive designation for its product
as a “Qualiﬁed Anti-Terrorism Technology,” including a risk exposure assessment. 284 Next, the seller’s
product must be certiﬁed for placement on the Approved Product List for Homeland Security, after review
by the Secretary.285 The seller must then conform to several insurance requirements, regardless of designa-
tion or certiﬁcation.286 The Act requires that the seller obtain liability insurance to cover their contractors,
subcontractors, supplies and vendors.287 Then the seller must purchase a speciﬁc amount of insurance from
279Greenberger, supra note 262, at 20.
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52available private sources.288 He then went on to point out, that once obtained, the protection is “so complete
and absolute that those injured by the technology have little ability to be compensated.”289 The SAFETY
Act does not provide compensation comparable to the Swine Flu Act, NCVIA or SEPPA.290 If the seller
has had its product designated, plaintiﬀs are prohibited from receiving punitive damages or proceeding on a
theory of joint and several liability, and there is a cap on liability.291 The SAFETY Act does not immunize
the seller from liability by substituting the federal government as the respondent; sellers will have to pay
awards via their private insurance, which will ultimately be passed on to sellers via increased premia and
hence, consumers.292 A second level of protection is aﬀorded to sellers that achieve both certiﬁcation and
designation under the SAFETY Act.293 In that set of circumstances, the seller may rely on the government
contractor defense, which is only rebuttable if the seller acted fraudulently or with willful misconduct, thus
leaving injured parties wholly uncompensated except for the rare case.294
b.
Pending Legislation in the 109th Congress
BioShield II,295 a bill introduced by Senators Lieberman, Hatch and Brownbeck, is the most comprehensive
attempt to deal with the issues presented by the implementation of the Project BioShield Act.296 To contend
with the confusing governmental bureaucracy, the bill calls for the establishments new federal oﬃces—one in
288Id. at 27.
289Id. at 28.
290Id.
291Id.
292Id.
293Id.
294Id. at 29.
295S. 975, 109th Cong. (2006).
296Other actions in the 109th Congress include: Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, 109 P.L. 148, Div. C;
Project BioShield Material Threats Act, H.R. 5028, 109th Cong. (2006); Protecting America in the War on Terror Act of
2005, S. 3, 109th Cong. (2005); National Biodefense Pandemic Preparedness Act of 2005, S. 1880, 109th Cong. (2005); and
Responsible Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Indemniﬁcation, S. 2291 (2006).
53HHS and one in DHS—to be responsible for the systematic implementation of Project BioShield’s goals.297
The legislation establishes the Oﬃce of Public Health Countermeasure Development in HHS to be responsible
for developing a national preparedness plan with regard to countermeasure development.298 The plan is to be
developed cooperatively with DHS and DOD and, expressly, the private sector.299 The Act then establishes
within DHS an Oﬃce of the Medical Readiness and Response to coordinate medical and public health
issues around the federal medical response and the federal support to state and local agencies for mass
casualty care.300 Senator Lieberman explained that “ultimately the Secretary of HHS has to be in charge”
of “incentivizing the biopharma industry to produce the countermeasures we need to protect the lives of the
American people from a bioterrorist attack and infectious diseases.”301 Hopefully, the designation of new
oﬃces to manage these issues speciﬁcally will ameliorate the problems identiﬁed by the private industry,
such as confusing and ambiguous government expectations.
In introducing the bill, Senator Lieberman referenced, in addition to terrorist threats, the SARS virus, the
1918 Spanish ﬂu pandemic, and avian inﬂuenza, as motivations for the legislation.302 S. 975 addresses issues
related these and other public health priorities by broadening the covered countermeasures. Pursuant to sec-
tion 201, expedited procurement authorities and the Special Reserve Fund are available for countermeasures
297The legislation actually establishes ten new related entities: 1) the Terrorism and Infectious Disease Countermeasure
Purchase Fund; 2) procurement pools for qualiﬁed countermeasures and security countermeasures; 3) the International Public
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Development within HHS; 5) the Oﬃce of Medical Readiness within DHS to assume functions of the National Disaster Medical
System and the Metropolitan Medical Response System; 6) the National Emergency Medical Readiness and Response Board
within DHS to oversee emergency medical response plans; 7) the National Center for Healthcare Technology Development to
manage NIH intellectual property; 8 the Millennium Medicine Discovery Award; 9) the Oﬃce of the Deputy Commissioner for
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54to “detect, diagnose, treat, or prevent an infectious disease adversely aﬀecting public health.”303 The legis-
lation would also set up “procurement pools” for infectious disease countermeasures.304 These pools would
allow the Secretary to aggregate funds from entities other than the federal government, such as NGOs, inter-
national health agencies, the United Nations and private non-proﬁt organizations.305 According to Senator
Lieberman’s oﬃce, these pools “may be the best way to proceed in utilizing BioShield for the development
of countermeasures where the United States is not the principal market (e.g. countermeasures for diseases
endemic in the developing world.).”306 Further, a prospective seller “can determine the full extent of the
market for the countermeasure and then United States can add [incentives]” to contribute to the initiative.307
Thus, the legislation has a more expansive vision of biological threats by including infectious diseases in the
statutory language and acknowledging potential partnerships based on other probable markets for successful
countermeasures.
Whereas the Project BioShield Act incentivized the results of countermeasure research and development—
the seller would fund the research at its own risk and expense—the orientation of BioShield II is additionally
to incentivize the research and development process.308 The legislation establishes a purchase fund and
authorizes advance, partial, or progress payments to BioShield contractors.309 Aimed speciﬁcally at the
“Valley of Death for Small Companies,” section 401 of the measure is to provide funding to ﬁrms to ensure
that they are able to bid on BioShield contracts.310 The following section authorizes reimbursement to these
small ﬁrms for various expenses.311 The proposed legislation thus directly addresses the issue of funding
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55streams available for companies to engage in this research and development.
The bill also grants an extensive array of incentives to encourage the participation of the pharmaceutical
industry. The bill oﬀers patent extension, federal tax incentives, federal tax credits, and patent protections.
A six-month to two-year patent extension is available if the seller has developed a new countermeasure that
is “superior to a previously available drug, antibiotic drug, biological product, device, detection technology
or research tool.”312 Firms that enter into BioShield contracts are eligible for their choice of ﬁve tax incen-
tives.313 Next, the bill amends the Internal Revenue code to make companies that engage in countermeasure
research eligible for three types of tax credits.314 Two forms of patent protections are available to companies
that successfully complete their BioShield contract: patent restoration and patent extension.315 Patent term
restoration allows a company to restore a patent for a “period equal to the number of days in the regulatory
review period,”316 thus all erosion of the patent from the date of issuance to the date of FDA approval
is restored.317 Patent term extension allows company to secure up to two years extension on an “eligible
patent,” which is one that the time the company “entered into the contract to develop [the] countermeasure,
was owned by or licensed to” that company.318 This incentive is only available if the Secretary of HHS
deems it is needed according to speciﬁed criteria.319 Otherwise known as a “wild-card patent extension” this
incentive in particular, has been the lightening rod for criticism.320 Critics say that the patent extension
is a “giveaway to the drug industry that would keep the costs of widely used drugs unnecessarily high.”321
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56The generic drug industry is particularly alarmed, as one representative stated, the bill “includes provisions
that reach into every medicine cabinet in America by eﬀectively eliminating consumers’ access to aﬀordable
generic products of everyday medicine...[the provisions] would unnecessarily and excessively penalize con-
sumers to the tune of tens of billions of dollars in lost pharmaceutical savings. They would institute new
loopholes that would extend additional and expensive market access savings provisions for brand products
already on the market.”322 Senator Lieberman has defended the provision, appealing to the broader de-
sire “urgently to draw the enormous capabilities of our biotech and pharmaceutical industry into providing
countermeasures.”323 He called the “patent bonus that a company could apply to a patent in its portfolio”
an “exchange for achieving the goal we have set which is to protect us from these terrible threats.”324
BioShield II addresses liability and compensation principally by extending the provisions of the SAFETY to
cover the types of addressed countermeasures. Liability protections are only available for companies that suc-
cessfully complete BioShield contracts, or during human clinical trials of a countermeasure.325 The SAFETY
Act is expressly amended to include covered countermeasures, including vaccines.326 The legislation also pro-
vides liability protection for administrators of covered countermeasures, like healthcare personnel, volunteers
and others, during a declared state or national emergency.327 The legislation does not provide much in the
way of compensation for victims—there are no punitive damages and no noneconomic damages available, and
the only grounds for compensation are willful and wanton misconduct.328 These liability and compensation
provisions are not ideal. One expert, testifying in the Senate speciﬁcally about this issue, explained:
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57A program needs to have the following components: One, protection of the vaccine manu-
facturer against lawsuits should be absolute, except in the case of gross negligence. What do
I mean by that? For instance, a failure to follow good manufacturing procedures during the
production and distribution of the vaccine. Two, health care workers and medical facilities
participating in the immunization program need complete protection against lawsuits un-
less they violate standard medical procedures when administering the vaccine. For instance,
failure to change needles in withdrawing a vaccine from a multi-dose ﬁle. Three, those who
develop a complication due to the vaccine should be reimbursed for their medical costs and
lost earnings but should not receive punitive damages.329
He further explained that, in order to achieve the “overall goal,” of “mak[ing] the necessary vaccines, ad-
minister[ing] them to a large number of people and hav[ing] a public willing to be immunized,” the federal
government is the “logical entity to provide the compensation.”330 As such, an extension of the NCVIA is
the sensible choice, rather than the extension of the complicated provision of the SAFETY Act and virtual
immunity for healthcare workers at the expense of the inevitable victims of countermeasure administration.
Overall, BioShield II contains a robust set of provisions aimed at addressing the implementation problems of
BioShield. The funding provisions, for instance, directly speak to the challenging experiences of drug com-
panies. The reorganization of HHS and DHS to include oﬃces that focus on these issues will also hopefully
clarify the government’s expectations. However, the legislation does not represent a consistent federal gov-
ernment commitment to the animating goals of BioShield. For example, the incentives granted do not come
from additional appropriated funds, but higher costs for drugs, fewer generic drugs, and tax expenditures.
Additionally, the liability provisions do not contain corresponding compensation provisions coming from
the federal government treasury. If the federal government is serious about addressing the threat posed by
330Id. §54.
58pandemic disease outbreak—emanating from a terrorist source or otherwise—new measures should address
these concerns.
V.
Conclusion
Ultimately, it is the federal government’s job to make sure that America is doing all that it can to prepare
for a possible bioterrorist attack. The Project BioShield Act of 2004 is an innovative measure designed to
address real deﬁcits in the market for countermeasures. However, BioShield is only a ﬁrst step. The Act
reﬂects a balance between the urgent need to stimulate a market for countermeasures, and Congress’ need
to impose limits on the Executive and make deliberate choices about how to best accomplish the tasks at
hand. Since the enactment of Project BioShield, Congress has held numerous hearings and is considering
a variety of legislative proposals in order to remedy the defects in the original Act that many industry
executives have pointed out. If Congress truly wants to prepare for a possible catastrophic biological attack
and accomplish the goals originally intended by Project BioShield, its next actions should account for the
legitimate criticisms of the Act and should provide a consistent and strong federal response.
59